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We discuss aspects of secure quantum communication by proposing and analyzing a
quantum analog of the Vernam cipher (one-time-pad). The quantum Vernam cipher
uses entanglement as the key to encrypt quantum information sent through an inse-
cure quantum channel. First, in sharp contrast with the classical Vernam cipher, the
quantum key can be recycled securely. We show that key recycling is intrinsic to the
quantum cipher-text, rather than using entanglement as the key. Second, the scheme
detects and corrects for arbitrary transmission errors, and it does so using only local op-
erations and classical communication (LOCC) between the sender and the receiver. The
application to quantum message authentication is discussed. Quantum secret sharing
schemes with similar properties are characterized. We also discuss two general issues,
the relation between secret communication and secret sharing, the classification of secure
communication protocols.
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1. Introduction
Recent developments in quantum information theory have brought many surprises in cryp-
tology. A partial list includes an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring 1 which can
break the condition for security in many cryptographic protocols, unconditionally secure
quantum key distribution protocols 2,3,4,5, and a no-go theorem for unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment 6,7. Cryptographic protocols for quantum information are also
being developed. For examples, see Refs. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
Emerging from these interesting results are important open questions on what quantum
mechanics admits and prohibits in cryptography and the reasons why. This paper reports
partial progress along this direction, by analyzing a proposed “quantum Vernam cipher”
which encrypts a quantum plain-text to a quantum cipher-text using entanglement as a
“key”. The proposed scheme is a quantum analog of various existing schemes, including
the classical Vernam cipher 14 (one-time-pad) in which all of the plain-text, the cipher-text,
and the key are classical, the eavesdrop-detecting channel 15, in which the plain-text and
the key are classical but the cipher-text is quantum, and the private quantum channel 8,9
in which the plain-text and the cipher-text are quantum but the key is classical.
1
2 Quantum Vernam Cipher
One intriguing property of the quantum Vernam cipher is that the key can be recycled
securely using test and purification procedures for entanglement 5,16.a As a comparison,
key recycling is insecure in the classical Vernam cipher 19 but secure in the eavesdrop-
detecting channel 15. These observations suggest that the security of key recycling comes
from the possibility to detect eavesdropping in the quantum cipher-text, rather than using
entanglement as a key. We give further support to this suggestion by modifying the private
quantum channel to securely recycle the classical key.
Another intriguing property of the quantum Vernam cipher is the ability to correct
for any damage on the transmitted quantum state. Moreover, the correction procedure
involves only classical communication between the sender and the receiver. These can be
explained by the theory of quantum secret sharing 10,11. Quantum secret sharing schemes
with similar properties are characterized. We discuss general connections between secret
communication and secret sharing, and apply the connections to other secret communica-
tion schemes.
As suggested by the above results, and in concert with our effort to relate cryptographic
properties to various elements in cryptographic schemes, we classify existing schemes ac-
cording to the classical or quantum nature of the communication channel and the key
(the resources) and the plain-text (the application), and consider the security of key recy-
cling and reliability for each class. Besides the schemes mentioned above, teleportation 20,
superdense coding 21, and key distribution protocols 2,3 are also included.
Secure key recycling and reliability are closely related to message authentication. We
briefly discuss applications of our analysis to the authentication of quantum messages 12,13.
Despite the fact that entanglement is recycled in the quantum Vernam cipher, we find
that, given the same resources, secure quantum communication can be more efficiently
realized by distributing entanglement and then teleporting the state. We emphasize that
our main goal is to understand and analyze security in quantum protocols; our proposed
cipher and the comparisons with other schemes are tools for doing so.
This paper is structured as follows. The quantum Vernam cipher is described in Sec-
tion 2 following the reviews of private key encryption and the private quantum channel.
Eavesdropping and error correction strategies are explained in Section 3. Key recycling is
analyzed in Section 4. The connections between secret communication and secret sharing
are discussed in Section 5. We conclude with a classification of secure communication pro-
tocols, some applications of the analysis to authentication, and some open questions. For
completeness, various relevant cryptographic schemes are described in Appendices A, C,
and D.
1.1. Definitions and Assumptions
In communication problems, the sender, the receiver, and any adversary (such as an
aA recent article 17 has independently reported using entanglement as a recyclable quantum key to conceal
classical information. The application to encrypt quantum information was suggested but not accom-
plished 18.
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eavesdropper) are traditionally called Alice, Bob, and Eve respectively. For simplicity in
notation and in the proofs, we make the following assumptions throughout the paper.
• Channel noise and logical errors are negligible.
• Alice and Bob have a 2-way classical broadcast channel. Hence classical communica-
tion is public but unjammable and authenticated (not forged or tampered with).
• Alice and Bob may also be given a quantum channel or entanglement. Such quantum
channel is assumed insecure, while the given entanglement is pure and authenticated.
The two quantum resources are inequivalent. Entanglement can be converted to a secure
quantum channel by teleportation (see Appendix A). A quantum channel which is insecure
can establish “mixed entanglement”, but further test and distillation procedures 16,5 are
needed to establish pure entanglement.
2. Concealing Ciphers
In this section, we describe the quantum Vernam cipher. We first review basic notions in
private key encryption, using the classical Vernam cipher, the eavesdrop-detecting chan-
nel, and the private quantum channel as examples. These examples also motivate the
construction of the quantum Vernam cipher. We concentrate on the ability to conceal the
communicated secret from an eavesdropping adversary. Other aspects of security will be
discussed later.
2.1. Private key encryption
In secret classical communication using private key encryption, Alice and Bob share a
secret string K, called the “key”, which encrypts (locks) a message M from Eve during
transmission and decrypts (opens) M for Bob afterwards.
For example, in the Vernam cipher 14, a random n-bit key K is used to encrypt an
n-bit message M (also known as the plain-text). Alice sends a cipher-text C = M ⊕ K
to Bob, where ⊕ denotes bitwise xor (addition modulo 2). Bob decodes by calculating
C ⊕ K = M . Shannon proved that 19 the Vernam cipher is absolutely secure:b C is
random and independent of M when K is random and unknown. Shannon also proved
that absolute security requires the entropy (thus the length) of K to be at least n. Thus
reusing a key, even with privacy amplification 22, compromises security when previously
transmitted cipher-text might have been tapped.
As another example, we consider a simple case of the eavesdrop-detecting channel 15.
Let r be a security parameter. An n-bit classical plain-text M is encrypted with two
(n+r)-bit classical keys K1,K2 into a quantum cipher-text as follows. Alice concatenates
M with r random subset parities of M to form M ′. She sends each bit of K1 ⊕M ′ in the
basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} depending on each bit of K2. After Bob receives and decodes
the cipher-text, Alice announces the random subsets. The decoded message is accepted
bA cipher is absolutely secure if C and M are independent.
4 Quantum Vernam Cipher
only if all the subset parities are correct. The security has been analyzed for the intercept-
resend attack. When l bits of the cipher-text have been intercepted, the probability to
have no inconsistencies in the subset parities is no more than (34 )
l, and the keys can be
reused with privacy amplification. The security against a more general attack, and bounds
on the information gain by Eve is not available in the literature. A similar analysis for a
different scheme is presented in Sec. 4.2.
2.2. Private quantum channel
We motivate the quantum Vernam cipher by reviewing the following canonical example of
the private quantum channel 8,9, which uses a classical key to encrypt a quantum plain-
text to a quantum cipher text. For simplicity, we call the canonical example the private
quantum channel. Let
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
,
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, ZX =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
, (1)
denote the 2 × 2 identity and three “Pauli matrices”. To send one quantum bit (qubit)
given by the density matrix ρ, Alice and Bob share a 2-bit key K = (k1, k2). Alice applies
Zk2Xk1 to ρ and sends to Bob the resulting “cipher-text” ρ′ = Zk2Xk1ρXk1Zk2 , which is
decoded by Bob by applying Xk1Zk2 . From Eve’s point of view, Alice is sending ρ, XρX ,
ZρZ, and ZXρXZ at random; she sees a mixture I2 which is independent of ρ. To send
an n-qubit state ρ, the 1-qubit scheme is applied bitwise. Let K be a 2n-bit classical key
with i-th bit ki. Let Xi and Zi denote X and Z acting on the i-th qubit. Alice sends to
Bob ρ′ = UKρ U
†
K , where UK =
⊗
i Z
k2i
i X
k2i−1
i . Bob applies U
†
K to recover ρ from ρ
′. Eve
sees a mixture of uniformly distributed possible states:
1
22n
∑
K
UKρ U
†
K =
1
2n
I⊗n , (2)
which is independent of ρ.c It was also proved in Ref. 8 that H(K) ≥ 2n is necessary to
completely randomize an arbitrary ρ. A schematic diagram is given in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The private quantum channel. Time runs from left to right. The symbols A, B, and
E stand for Alice, Bob, and Eve and denote the owners of the registers. Double lines represent
classical bits. X and Z are applied to the quantum state if their respective classical control bits
equal 1. These conventions are assumed throughout the paper.
c Equation (2) can be derived using the Pauli decomposition of ρ: each nontrivial component anticommutes
with half of the UK and vanishes in the sum, leaving only the identity term.
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2.3. The quantum Vernam cipher
We use entanglement as the key in our quantum Vernam cipher. The fundamental unit
of entanglement is an “ebit”. Alice and Bob are said to share an ebit if each possesses
one qubit of a known maximally entangled state of two qubits, such as the EPR states
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉). The procedure to transmit one qubit using two ebits is summa-
rized in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. The quantum Vernam cipher to send one qubit.
The registers in Fig. 2 are labeled by a1, a2, b1, b2, and m. The two registers a1, b1 are
initially in the state |Φ+〉, and so are a2, b2. The registers a1, a2 belong to Alice and b1, b2
belong to Bob all the time. The register m initially carries the message ρ and belongs to
Alice. Alice applies a controlled-X (cnot) from a1 tom and a controlled-Z (cz) from a2 to
m and sends m to Bob. We assume Eve takes control of m during the transmission. When
Bob receives m, he applies a cz from b2 to m, followed by a cnot from b1 to m to recover
ρ. To send an n-qubit state ρ, the one-qubit protocol is applied bitwise. We show that the
quantum Vernam cipher is a purification of the private quantum channel, superposing all
possible key states: The key registers (a1, b1, · · · , a2n, b2n) have initial state |Φ+〉⊗2n. Re-
ordering the qubits as (a1, · · · , a2n, b1, · · · , b2n), the initial key state 12n
∑
K |K〉|K〉, where
K ranges over all 2n-bit strings, is indeed the superposition of all possible classical keys.
Finally, the quantum Vernam cipher and the private quantum channel have equivalent en-
coding and decoding operations, establishing the claim. Eve sees a cipher-text described
by tracing out the subsystem {a1, · · · , a2n, b1, · · · , b2n}, which corresponds to averaging
over all possible keys |K〉|K〉. Following the discussion in Section 2.2, Eve sees the state
I⊗n/2n. Thus Eve obtains no information on ρ.
In the absence of eavesdropping, the circuit in Fig. 2 acts trivially, so that ρ is recovered,
and the key |Φ+〉⊗2n is regenerated. We now consider the effects of eavesdropping.
3. Eavesdropping and Error Correction
Even though Eve obtains no information from the cipher-text, she may disturb, destroy,
or alter it, and entangle her ancilla with the quantum key to be regenerated. In this section,
we describe the effects of eavesdropping and a basic correction method, which are starting
points for our discussions in Sections 4 and 5.
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3.1. General eavesdropping and correction strategy
We assume that the plain-text is initially disentangled from Eve. Eve’s most general
strategy is to apply a joint unitary operation U on the transmitted cipher-text and a
pure state ancilla of hers, and send Bob “something”. We may assume she outputs the
correct number of qubits as Bob can add or discard qubits. Note that there is no further
communication from Eve to Alice or Bob. Thus subsequent action F by Eve on her ancilla
cannot change the superoperator E that describes the transmission of the cipher-text. The
situation is summarized as
E
A
A
B
E
U
F
B
A
B

EA
A
B
B
A
B
A convenient representation of E is given by 23,24
E(ρ) =
∑
ij
eijPiρP
†
j (3)
where eij are entries of a positive matrix and the sum is over all Pauli matrices Pi on
the n-qubit cipher-text. Equation (3) can be interpreted as a process that transforms a
state ρ into a mixture
∑
kDkρD
†
k where Dk are noninterfering errors. Expressing each
Dk as a linear combination of Pauli matrices, one obtains Eq. (3). The Pi in Eq. (3) thus
represent errors that may interfere with each other 25. Using the language of quantum
error correction, we call the Pi Pauli errors. We now show that if Alice and Bob determine
with high probability what Pauli error has occurred, their final state is almost disentangled
from Eve. The process of determining the error is called syndrome extraction.
The cipher-text is generally part of a state ρ˜ obtained from encoding the plain-text
with some ancilla. The state possessed by Alice and Bob after the transmission is given
by
(I ⊗ E)(ρ˜) =
∑
ij
eij(I ⊗ Pi)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †j ) (4)
where the identity operator I acts on the uncommunicated subsystem.
First suppose it is possible to perfectly distinguish the states (I ⊗ Pi)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †i ) nonde-
structively. Then, there is a projective measurement Q with projectors Qi such that
if j = i Qi(I ⊗ Pj)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †j )Qi = (I ⊗ Pj)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †j ) , (5)
if j 6= i Qi(I ⊗ Pj)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †j )Qi = 0 . (6)
Since ρ˜ is positive, Eqs. (5) and (6) are equivalent to
if j = i Qi(I ⊗ Pj)ρ˜ = (I ⊗ Pj)ρ˜ , (7)
if j 6= i Qi(I ⊗ Pj)ρ˜ = 0 . (8)
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The projector Qi removes any term in Eq. (4) with a Pj for all j 6= i, leaving only the
output (I ⊗ Pi)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †i ), which is independent of E and disentangled from Eve.
We will consider situations deviating from the above perfect scenario. For example,
the measurement outcome i may be accompanied by some irreversible state change Oi.
Moreover, the measurement may only distinguish subsets of errors or be probabilistic, so
that multiple terms in Eq. (4) may remain in the final state. In any case, if a syndrome i is
extracted with high probability, the post-measurement state has density matrix dominated
by Oi(I ⊗ Pi)ρ˜(I ⊗ P †i )O†i , and is almost disentangled from Eve.
Suppose Alice and Bob reuse a private key obtained from (I⊗E)(ρ˜) which is entangled
with Eve. Eve can learn about the future communication or correlate different rounds of
communicated materials only through the correlation with the reused private key. Such
correlation is small when syndrome extraction succeeds with high probability, in which case
Eve has little information on any nontrivial function on all the plain-text. Key recycling
is then semantically secure 26. A scheme is semantically secure 26, if there is vanishing
difference between the probabilities to estimate the value of any nontrivial function on the
plain-text, with or without the cipher-text.
3.2. Error correction for the quantum Vernam cipher
Recall that it suffices to identify the Pauli error that occurs in the cipher-text. We show
how this can be done perfectly in the quantum Vernam cipher. We use the fact that Fig. 2
acts trivially, and the commutation relations
X X X
s s
=
X , Z Z Z
s s
=
Z ,
X Z X
s s
=
Z
Z
, Z X Z
s s
=
X
Z
,
to find the effect of errors on the cipher-text for the one-qubit protocol:
X Z X Z X
 
 


 
 


s
s
s
s
=
Z
 
 


 
 


X
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and
X Z Z Z X
 
 


 
 


s
s
s
s
=
 
 


Z
 
 


Z
An X error in the transmitted cipher-text propagates to the decoded message together
with a Z error on b2, changing {a2, b2} from |Φ+〉 into |Φ−〉. Likewise, a Z error turns
{a1, b1} into |Φ−〉 and an XZ error turns both EPR pairs into |Φ−〉. Alice and Bob
can distinguish |Φ+〉 from |Φ−〉 by independently measuring their halves of the EPR pair
along the |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) basis and comparing their results on a broadcast channel.
Since |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(| ++〉+ | − −〉) and |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(| +−〉+ | − +〉), the measured state is
|Φ+〉 (|Φ−〉) when their results agree (disagree). Therefore, the possible Pauli errors I, X ,
Z, and XZ can be perfectly distinguished and corrected. The same argument applies to
transmitting n qubits.
We emphasize that this detection procedure effectively turns Eve’s most general action
into a Pauli error. An example to recover the message without the cipher-text is given in
Appendix B.
4. Key Recycling
We have seen that the EPR pairs in the quantum Vernam cipher can be measured to
extract the exact error syndrome. We now show that, when many qubits are sent, it
is possible to use less entanglement (per qubit) for syndrome extraction with very high
probability. The remaining EPR pairs can be recycled, with semantic security. We show
strong evidence that security is due to transmitting a quantum cipher-text, rather than
using entanglement as the key, by modifying the private quantum channel to recycle a
classical key.
4.1. Recycling quantum key
Recall that after sending n qubits with the quantum Vernam cipher, Alice and Bob share
2n EPR pairs either in |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉, in a one-to-one correspondence with the Pauli error
in the cipher-text. Syndrome extraction is equivalent to learning the identity of these
EPR pairs. Asymptotically, this can be done in two steps. The first step, adapted from
Ref. 5, is a preliminary test for eavesdropping by testing if the EPR pairs are |Φ〉⊗2n.
Without indication of eavesdropping, the decoded state is accepted, and the EPR pairs
are recycled. Otherwise, a second step is performed to find the identity of the EPR pairs
by a random hashing method adapted from Ref. 16. This procedure applies to the most
general eavesdropping strategy.
Let the identity of the 2n EPR pairs be represented by a 2n-bit string v, with 0 and 1
Debbie W. Leung 9
corresponding to |Φ+〉 and |Φ−〉.d We first describe a useful protocol to obtain the parity of
a subset of bits in v. The “bilateral xor” (bxor), defined as cnota1a2×cnotb1b2 ,e effects
the transformation:
|Φ+〉|Φ+〉 → |Φ+〉|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉|Φ−〉 → |Φ+〉|Φ−〉 ,
|Φ+〉|Φ−〉 → |Φ−〉|Φ−〉 , |Φ−〉|Φ+〉 → |Φ−〉|Φ+〉 ,
where the qubits are ordered as a1, b1, a2, b2. The control pair (a1, b1) becomes the parity
of the two pairs. Likewise, the parity of a subset {s1, s2, s3, · · ·} can be found by applying
bxor from an extra |Φ+〉 to all of {s1, s2, s3, · · ·}.
For the preliminary test for eavesdropping, let r be a security parameter. Alice and
Bob pick r random subsets of v and find their parities using r extra |Φ+〉.f If v = 0,
all subsets have even parities. Otherwise, each random subset has equal probability to be
odd or even, and the probability of obtaining only even parities is 2−r.
If all r parities are even, Alice and Bob recycle the 2n-ebit key. The probability for
Alice and Bob to miss an error in the decoded message and recycle a compromised key is
Prob(pass and erroneous) ≤ Prob(pass|erroneous) = 1
2r
which can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently large r.
If any subset has odd parity, Alice and Bob determine v as follows. The distribution of
v is generally unknown. However, Alice and Bob can estimate the Hamming weight g of
v by sampling r2 random bits of v. How r2 depends on the security level can be found
as follows. If the Hamming weight of v is αn, and α˜r2 1’s are sampled, Chebyshev’s
inequality implies ∀δ > 0 Prob(|α˜ − α| ≥ δ) < 14δ2r2 .h Hence ∀ǫ > 0, choosing r2 > 14δ2ǫ
guarantees Prob(α ∈ (α˜ − δ, α˜ + δ)) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Thus with probability larger than 1 − ǫ,
v ∈ T the typical set of a binomial distribution with bias α˜ and with size no greater than
22nH(α˜+δ). Here, H denotes the binary entropy function 27 and for simplicity α˜+ δ < 12 .
As each random subset parity eliminates about half of the possible values of v, v can be
identified with r3 ≈ 2nH(α˜+ δ) random subset parities. Approximately 2n(1−H(α˜+ δ))
EPR pairs can be recycled with vanishing correlation with Eve.
Note that the preliminary test uses r ebits, and the second step uses r2 + r3 ebits.
Since r and r2 are independent of n, they are negligible for asymptotically large n. In
contrast, r3 ∝ n. This is the reason for splitting the procedure into two steps. Finally, we
use classical probabilities throughout the discussion since measurements are only made in
the |Φ±〉 basis 5.
dThis representation is a simplified version of that in Ref. 16.
e The first and second subscripts denote the control and target bits.
f These extra |Φ+〉 are unnecessary but they simplify the procedure.
gThe Hamming weight is the number of 1s in a bit-string.
hThe test bits are identically distributed, and negatively correlated, so that Chebyshev’s inequality applies.
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4.2. Recycling classical key
To illustrate that secure recycling is not a property special to entanglement, we adapt a
scheme in Ref. 15 to recycle the classical key in the private quantum channel. The main
idea is to add known test qubits to detect errors effectively. Specifically, consider sending
n qubits with security parameter r. Alice encodes the n qubits with a 2n-bit classical key
as in the original scheme described in Section 2.2. She appends to the data qubits 2r test
qubits, called x1, · · · , xr, z1, · · · , zr, in the state |0〉⊗r|+〉⊗r. Each test bit may be flipped
|0〉 → |1〉, |+〉 → |−〉 depending on a 2r-bit classical key. In addition, she picks 2r random
subsets Sx1, · · · , Sxr, Sz1, · · · , Szr of the n data qubits. For each i, a cnot is applied from
each qubit in Sxi to xi. Likewise, a cnot is applied from zi to each qubit in Szi. Alice also
picks r random subsets Tx1, · · · , Txr of {z1, · · · , zr} and applies a cnot from each zj ∈ Txi
to xi.
i Then, she sends all n+ 2r qubits to Bob. After Bob announces receipt of all the
qubits, Alice announces all 3r subsets. Bob decodes by inverting Alice’s operation. If the
test qubits are in the state |0〉⊗n|+〉⊗n, he accepts the decoded data qubits and recycles
the classical key. The main idea behind the modification is illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. The modified private quantum channel. ρ1, · · · , ρn are n data qubits. Depending on the
key, Ui = I, X, Z, or XZ, U˜1,···,r = I or X, and U˜r+1,···,2r = I or Z. We only show the operations
related to Sx1, Sz1, and Tx1, with Sx1 = {1, 2}, Sz1 = {m,n}, and Tx1 = {1} as examples. The
symbol // denotes a qubit in transit (and at risk).
i Note that Tx1, · · · , Txr also define r random subsets Tz1, · · · , Tzr of x1, · · · , xr such that a cnot is applied
from zj to each xi ∈ Tzi.
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If no error occurs to the (n+2r)-qubit cipher-text during transmission, the test qubits
are always decoded as |0〉⊗r|+〉⊗r. However, if a nontrivial Pauli error occurs, the test
qubits are not decoded as |0〉⊗r|+〉⊗r with probability higher than 1 − 2−r. To see this,
decompose the Pauli error into its X and Z components, and without loss of generality,
the X component is nontrivial. The overall effect of the extra cnot can be found using
the commutation relations in Section 3.2. An Xj during transmission becomes Xj and an
extra Xxi on the original cipher-text if j ∈ Sxi. Likewise, Xzj becomes Xzj with an extra
Xxi if zj ∈ Txi. An Xxi decodes to itself. Thus xi has an overall X error if an odd number
of X occurs to Sxi∪Txi∪xi. As any nontrivial tensor product of X errors is equally likely
to act on an even or odd number of qubits in a random subset, the probability for x1, · · ·,
xr to decode to |0〉⊗r is 2−r. A Z error is propagated to the zi similarly. Note that the X
and Z components act independently on the test qubits, and the xi are unaffected by Z
errors and the zi are unaffected by X errors. This completes the proof that any nontrivial
Pauli error is undetected with probability no more that 2−r.
We now prove the security of key recycling against the most general eavesdropping
strategy. Using the framework of Section 3.1, let the received cipher-text be E(ρ) =∑
ij eijPiρP
†
j . Let P0 be the identity Pauli error. Each set of random subsets corresponds
to a detection scheme that distinguishes a set of Pauli errors PI from its complement, and
P0 ∈ PI . The accepted output is Ea(ρ) ∝
∑
Pi,Pj∈PI eijPiρP
†
j . Averaged over the random
subsets, the unnormalized accepted state is given by
Ea(ρ) =
∑
ij
cijeijPiρP
†
j (9)
where cij ≤ 2−r except for c00 = 1.
The recycling scheme is secure if there is vanishing probability for Eve to obtain a
nonvanishing amount of information, IEve, on the recycled bits. Since the keys are recycled
only if the state is accepted, we only need to show that the following is vanishing for any
nonvanishing threshold Ithres
Prob (accept and IEve ≥ Ithres) = Prob (accept)× Prob (IEve ≥ Ithres| accept) . (10)
We now show that one of the two factors in Eq. (10) has to vanish when r is sufficiently
large. Using the normalization of the accepted state in Eq. (9), Prob(accept) ≤ e00 +
2−r(1− e00) can be made vanishing unless e00 is nonvanishing. In this case, we can show
that Prob(IEve ≥ Ithres| accept) is vanishing. The amount of information IEve is bounded
by the entropy of Eve’s reduced density matrix, which in turns is bounded by the entropy
of Ea(ρ)/tr(Ea(ρ)) when maximized over pure input states ρ. Rewriting the unnormalized
state Ea(|ψ〉〈ψ|):
Ea(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = e00|ψ〉〈ψ|+
∑
(i,j) 6=(0,0)
cijeijPi|ψ〉〈ψ|P †j , (11)
it can be verified that, when e00 is nonvanishing, increasing r makes the second term vanish,
and Ea(|ψ〉〈ψ|)/tr(Ea(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) is arbitrarily close to |ψ〉〈ψ| and has vanishing entropy. Thus
IEve has to vanish, and same for Prob(IEve ≥ Ithres|accept) for any finite Ithres.
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5. The Quantum Vernam Cipher and Secret Sharing
We now explain the properties of the quantum Vernam cipher in terms of general connec-
tions 28 between secret communication and secret sharing 10,11. A (classical or quantum)
secret sharing scheme divides a secret into shares. The secret is retrievable only with
enough shares, which form the authorized sets. Other sets are unauthorized. In general,
unauthorized sets can have partial information. We restrict to perfect schemes in which
unauthorized sets have no information. A (k, n) threshold scheme is a perfect scheme in
which any k out of n shares form an authorized set. In addition to the usual properties,
quantum secret sharing schemes also obey the no-cloning theorem 29, so that complements
of authorized sets are unauthorized. Finally, in pure state perfect quantum secret sharing
schemes, complements of unauthorized sets are authorized.
Any private key encryption scheme (classical or quantum) which conveys a message
from Alice to Bob but conceals it from Eve is a secret sharing scheme. The secret is
divided into three shares: A and B are private shares for Alice and Bob, and E is the
share communicated from Alice to Bob. ThusA andB represent the key, and E represents
the cipher-text. By definition, {A,E} and {B,E} are authorized while B and E are
unauthorized. In a quantum cipher, A is unauthorized. If additionally, the scheme is
pure, {A,B} is authorized: the scheme is a (2, 3) threshold scheme.
The quantum Vernam cipher is an example of pure state threshold scheme described
above. Entanglement is regenerated becauseA and B are identical shares. Errors on E are
correctable because {A,B} is authorized. Furthermore, in the quantum Vernam cipher:
(1) Alice can encode an unknown message and her half of the key into the correctly
distributed shares all by herself, and (2) errors on E are correctable using only local
quantum operations and classical communication (LOCC) between Alice and Bob. We
now characterize secret sharing schemes with these two properties. Property (1) holds
for all pure state quantum secret sharing schemes in which the reduced density matrix
of B is maximally mixed. This follows from the proof of the impossibility of quantum
bit commitment 7, that two pure states with the same reduced density matrix in Bob’s
system can be transformed to each other by unitary operations acting outside Bob’s system.
Property (2) holds asymptotically if the entanglement between A and B (in ebits) in the
secret sharing scheme is at least twice the size ofE (in qubits). This follows from comparing
the number of errors to be distinguished with the amount of information obtainable in the
random hashing method 16.
As an example to construct a cipher from a secret sharing scheme with the above
characterization, consider the (2,3) threshold scheme obtained from the 5-qubit 1-error
correcting code 16,30, by assigning two qubits to each of A and B, and one qubit to E.
The encoding circuit Uenc can be specified by how the stabilizer and the encoded opera-
tions evolve 31. As Uenc is in the Clifford group
31, a circuit implementing Uenc can be
constructed using a scheme in Ref. 31. The decoding circuit can be constructed similarly.
The cipher obtained is shown in Fig. 4.
We find from Fig. 4 that the four possible Pauli errors in the cipher-text correlate with
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Fig. 4. The 5-bit code as a quantum cipher. In the circuit, Y = iXZ, H = 1√
2
(X+Z), and a
vertical line with × in both ends is a swap operation.
the EPR pairs being |Φ+〉⊗2, |Φ−〉⊗2, |Ψ+〉⊗2, and |Ψ−〉⊗2, where |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉± |10〉).
The four cases are distinguishable by LOCC.
Cleve 32 derived another example of a cipher from a secret sharing scheme (Ap-
pendix C). It is a (2, 3) threshold scheme in which all three shares are 3-dimensional.
Errors on E cannot be corrected with LOCC, unless extra entanglement is available to
Alice and Bob. On the other hand, this cipher requires less entanglement to conceal the
message.
We can apply the connections between secret sharing and secret communication to
the private quantum channel and teleportation 20 (see also Appendix D) which encrypts a
quantum plain-text to a classical cipher-text using a quantum key.j In teleportation, after
Alice’s measurements, E is the outcome (k1, k2) to be communicated andB is the quantum
state Zk2Xk1 |ψ〉 possessed by Bob. In the private quantum channel, A = B = (k1, k2)
is the classical key, and E = Zk2Xk1 |ψ〉 is the communicated quantum state.k Viewing
A and B in the second scheme as one share, both schemes are the same (2, 2) thresh-
old scheme with the quantum and classical shares interchanged. As a mixed state (2, 2)
scheme, errors on one share is not correctable, as we have seen in the private quantum
channel. However, in teleportation, the classical share is broadcast and no correction is
needed. Finally, the quantum Vernam cipher, with the three shares forming the state
1
2
∑
k1k2
|k1k2〉 |k1k2〉 Zk2Xk1 |ψ〉 is just the purification of the (2, 2) scheme.
6. Conclusion
We have analyzed two important properties of the quantum Vernam cipher, the security
of recycling keys and the reliability of the transmission, and have made comparisons with
other related schemes. These results are summarized and extended to other existing
schemes in the following table 35, which is explained next.
j Teleportation paradoxically communicates quantum states securely without quantum communication.
The closely related remote state preparation 33,34 may not be secure.
kThis provides an alternative proof for the lower bound of the classical key size, since an important classical
share is at least twice the size of the quantum secret 11,28.
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Type Example Security of Reliability
CKM key recycling
CCC Classical one-time-pad × √
CCQ Impossible
CQC Entanglement based ×
key distribution 3
CQQ Teleportation × √
QCC Eavesdrop-detecting channel
√ ×
QCQ Private quantum channel
√ ×
QQC Superdense coding 21
√∗ ×
QQQ Quantum Vernam cipher
√ √
Q0C BB84 2
Q0Q Establishing entanglement
∗ Requires quantum back-communication.
In the table, the type of cryptographic protocol is specified by three elements: the
communication channel (which is of the same type as the cipher-text C), the key K, and
the message M to be conveyed. A 3-alphabet string represents these three elements in
order. Q, C, and 0 respectively stand for the element being quantum, classical, and non-
existing. The first property in question is the security of key recycling and the second
property is reliability – whether the correct message is received with high probability. The
security properties are based on Alice and Bob having an unjammable 2-way classical
broadcast channel.
We can extrapolate the properties of the specific examples to classes of ciphers. For
example, due to the use of an unjammable classical broadcast channel, all ciphers of the
type C−− are reliable. In contrast, ciphers of the type Q−− are susceptible to errors,
unless a large quantum key is available, such as in the quantum Vernam cipher. Since
in the worst case the quantum channel is jammed, a general recovery procedure would
involve LOCC and is effectively of the type CQQ (though the exact protocol needs not
be teleportation). The very same unjammable classical channel in C−− cannot detect
for eavesdropping, and used key can be compromised. The susceptibility in the quantum
channel in Q−− is also the reason why it can detect eavesdropping and reject compromised
keys. This quantum feature also allows key distribution to be possible.
The secure properties of the quantum Vernam cipher come at a price – it requires a
quantum channel and pre-shared entanglement. In fact, for the same resources, one can use
the quantum channel to establish entanglement and use the entanglement to teleport the
state. The two methods are compared in Appendix E. We are not aware of a circumstance
in which QQQ is more efficient than the hybrid method Q0Q + CQQ. This is not surprising
in view of the above discussion, since the hybrid method exploits the advantages of both
types of ciphers.
We have ensured security in key recycling by detecting errors in the cipher-text. This
objective is very similar to that of message authentication – to reject a forged or altered
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message with high probability. For example, our modification to the private quantum
channel described in Section 4.2 can be viewed as an authentication step for the encrypted
quantum message. For authentication, all Ui in Figure 3 can be omitted. The test qubits
can detect both forging and tampering with high probability due to the random flip based
on the 2r-bit classical key. Forging succeeds with probability no better than 2−r and
the fidelity of an accepted message with respect to the origin cipher-text is of order 1 −
O(2−r). This means that authenticating n qubits given an insecure quantum channel
and an authenticated 2-way classical channel requires only 2r bits of classical key and
an extra 2r qubits of quantum communication. We can also drop the assumption of
authenticity in the classical communication given a larger key to classically authenticate
the classical messages, for example, using the Wegman-Carter method 36.l Recently,
authentication protocols for quantum message using a classical key but no additional
classical communication are proposed 12,13.
Returning to the connection with secret sharing, we have seen that in the quantum
Vernam cipher, the quantum secret can be unlocked from an authorized set using only
LOCC between the parties. Under the same conditions, hardly any information can be
obtained in a recently proposed scheme 37 to share a classical secret. It will be interesting
to understand the origin of such differences. It might be related to the amount of entan-
glement shared between the parties in the secret sharing scheme, and further investigation
is underway. More generally, secret sharing schemes have mostly been analyzed assuming
no or full cooperation between the different parties, and the security under LOCC remains
an interesting area to be explored.
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Appendix A. Definitions of some Ciphers
We briefly describe the ciphers which are not reviewed elsewhere in this paper:
• Entanglement based key distribution Alice and Bob share a large number of |Φ+〉.
They measure their halves of the EPR pairs independently in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis.
Their measurement results can be used as keys. If Alice and Bob are given a quan-
tum channel instead, they first establish pure entanglement with the standard test
procedures.
• BB84 Alice sends to Bob {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} chosen at random, and Bob measures
them in random basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉}. They subsequently announce their
bases. Only the measurement results obtained in the matching basis are used. A
sufficient number of the results are announced and compared to test for eavesdrop-
ping. Upon passing the test, privacy amplification 22 is applied to the results not
announced to establish classical keys.
• Superdense coding Alice and Bob share one copy of |Φ+〉. Alice can send 2 classical
bits c1, c2 securely to Bob as follows. Alice applies X
c1Zc2 on her half of |Φ+〉 and
sends it to Bob. Bob can determine c1, c2 by a Bell measurement on both qubits.
Appendix B. Recovery of Message without the Cipher-text
Without loss of generality, let the message be |ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉. Ordering the registers as
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(a1, b1, a2, b2,m), the system has initial state |Φ+〉|Φ+〉|ψ〉. The state changes:
1
2
[ |0000〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉+ |1111〉 ] (a|0〉+ b|1〉)
→ 1
2
[ |0000〉(a|0〉+ b|1〉) + |0011〉(a|0〉 − b|1〉)
+ |1100〉(a|1〉+ b|0〉) + |1111〉(−a|1〉+ b|0〉) ] (B.1)
→ 1
2
[
a(|0000〉+ |0011〉) + b(|1100〉+ |1111〉) ]
⊕ 1
2
[
b(|0000〉 − |0011〉) + a(|1100〉 − |1111〉) ] (B.2)
→ 1
2
[
a(|0000〉+ |0011〉)|0〉+ b(|1100〉+ |1111〉)|1〉 ]
⊕ 1
2
[
b(|0000〉 − |0011〉)|0〉+ a(|1100〉 − |1111〉)|1〉 ] (B.3)
=
1
4
[
(|00〉+ |11〉)(|00〉+ |11〉)(a|0〉+ b|1〉)
+ (|00〉 − |11〉)(|00〉+ |11〉)(a|0〉 − b|1〉) ]
⊕ 1
4
[
(|00〉+ |11〉)(|00〉 − |11〉)(b|0〉+ a|1〉)
+ (|00〉 − |11〉)(|00〉 − |11〉)(b|0〉 − a|1〉) ] (B.4)
describe the encoding (Eq. (B.1)), the removal of m (Eq. (B.2)), and the decoding by Bob
after he substitutes |0〉 for m (Eq. (B.3)). The ⊕ denotes a mixture of states: ⊕i|ψi〉 ≡
|ψi〉〈ψi|. The decoded state is rewritten in Eq. (B.4), to which the syndrome measurement
described in Section 3.2 is applicable.
Appendix C. Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme as Secure Quantum Channel
We describe another cipher due to Cleve 32 constructed from a (2, 3) threshold quantum
secret sharing scheme. The plain-text |ψ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉+ γ|2〉 is a three dimensional state
(a qutrit). We define the following gates acting on qutrits:
jii
jji
jii
jj+ii
t
i
jii
jji
t
i
jii
jj ii
jii j ii 
where sums and differences are taken modulo 3. The proposed scheme can be represented
by the following circuit:
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in which the maximally entangled state is 1√
3
(|00〉 + |12〉 + |21〉), A, B represent the
private shares of Alice and Bob, and // represents a transmission from Alice to Bob. The
regenerated entangled state is explicitly marked. Encoding is performed locally by Alice.
As a (2, 3) threshold scheme, any error in the transmitted qutrit is correctable. However,
correction cannot be performed using only LOCC operations by Alice and Bob. To see
this, we first rearrange the qutrits in the circuit and redefine the maximally entangled
state as 1√
3
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉).

 
==  
t
i t
i
t
i t
i
j i j i
A
B
We can now easily find the effect of an error E during transmission, for the following
circuits are equivalent:
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We consider an error basis on a qutrit generated by X and Z where X |j〉 = |j+1〉 and
Z|j〉 = e2πij/3|j〉. Using the commutation relations
h
X
h
s s
=
X ,
h
Z
h
s s
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Z
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h h
X
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, h h
Z
s s
=
Z
,
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the overall effects due to the errors Xt and Zt can be obtained:

 
X
 t
X
 2t
,

 
Z
t
Z
 t
The 9 possible errors are correlated with 9 orthogonal maximally entangled states, which
are globally distinguishable but indistinguishable with LOCC, or else Alice and Bob can
identify maximally entangled states from the maximally mixed state and distill entangle-
ment out of nothing.
Appendix D. Teleportation
Without loss of generality, consider the teleportation of a pure state |ψ〉 = a|0〉+b|1〉 using
the following circuit:
j i
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j i
It is easily verified that the initial state 1√
2
(a|0〉+ b|1〉)(|00〉+ |11〉) is transformed to
1
2
[ |00〉(a|0〉+ b|1〉) + |01〉(a|0〉 − b|1〉) (D.1)
+ |10〉(a|1〉+ b|0〉) + |11〉(−a|1〉+ b|0〉) ] (D.2)
=
1
2
∑
k1k2
|k1〉|k2〉Zk2Xk1 |ψ〉 (D.3)
right before measurement. The measurement results k1, k2 are sent over a classical channel
to recover |ψ〉.
Appendix E. Comparison of Resources
We compare the asymptotic resources required to send n qubits securely by (1) the quan-
tum Vernam cipher (QQQ) and (2) establishing entanglement and teleporting (Q0Q +
CQQ). We compare the net amount of entanglement consumed, allowing both schemes
n uses of an insecure quantum channel and unlimited uses of a 2-way classical broadcast
channel. The quantum Vernam cipher uses 2n(1−F ) ebits where F is the recyclable frac-
tion of entanglement. Teleportation uses n(1 −D2) ebits where nD2 ebits are distillable
from n uses of the quantum channel. Hence, teleportation is more efficient if and only if
F ≤ (1 +D2)/2.
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In the following comparisons, we use more optimal recycling strategies than that in
Section 4.1. Without eavesdropping, F ≈ D2 ≈ 1. If Eve measures every qubit in the
computation basis, Z occurs randomly. Hence D2 = 0 and F = 1/2 since the EPR pairs
detecting X errors are intact. If I, X , Z, XZ occur with probabilities 1/2, 1/6, 1/6,
1/6, D2 = 0 and F = 0.1037. For a completely random Pauli channel, D2 = F = 0.
Hence for the first two cases, the two methods are equally efficient. For the last two cases,
teleportation is much more efficient.
